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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 CONAKRY 000102

SIPDIS  
SENSITIVE

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E.O. 12958: N/A

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SUBJECT: CONAKRY RESPONSE - ASSESSING THE NEED FOR  
INCREASED LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL TRAINING

REF: STATE 05448

**¶11.** (U) In response to reftel request, Post submits the following information regarding assessed needs for increased law enforcement and judicial training in Guinea. Post notes that the USG has suspended aid to Guinea, with the exception of humanitarian and democracy assistance, in response to the December 23 coup d'etat and the subsequent installation of a military junta.

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KEY CHALLENGES  
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**¶12.** (SBU) Guinea's civilian law enforcement faces a wide range of challenges, both internal and regional. Conakry is rated as critical for crime, which is largely due to the high frequency of theft, assault, and general banditry. Such crime occurs primarily in the capital, but also throughout urban centers in the interior. Many of these crimes are committed by individuals in uniforms who are believed to be military personnel, but may also be members of the police force, or bandits who bought easily acquired uniforms. Gang-style elements exist in the capital, largely defined by ethnicity or nationality.

**¶13.** (SBU) Over the past 18 months, drug trafficking has grown exponentially in Guinea, causing the country to emerge as a regional hub for such activity. Guinea's notoriously porous borders make smuggling of goods (counterfeit and otherwise) and human trafficking significant problems. Available statistics are unreliable, but contacts estimate that several hundred individuals are trafficked in Guinea annually, both internally and trans-nationally.

**¶14.** (SBU) During the recent wars that engulfed the region, Guinea served as a transit point for arms trafficking. International scrutiny and regional stability significantly reduced this practice, although some arms trafficking may still be occurring. Domestic and transnational terrorism networks in Guinea are not remarkable. However, the French believe they may be pushed south of the Sahel due to successes by U.S. and international partners. Additionally, it is not clear how important Guinea is to Hezbollah or Hamas--or even Al Qaida.

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HOST GOVERNMENT CAPACITY  
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¶5. (SBU) Guinea's police force is generally incapable of addressing the challenges described above. A police strike in 2007 followed a military mutiny in 2008, in which military personnel killed at least 12 police officers, largely stripped the civilian police forces of remaining training facilities and equipment while damaging any existing inter-agency enforcement initiatives. In addition, many police officers may now feel threatened by their military counterparts, rendering them incapable of countering rampant crime committed by others in uniform. Currently headed by a military general, who is a member of the ruling military junta, the civilian police forces lack any consistent training programs, supply system or finances. The police have been under-resourced and under-trained for years, and they have now been further marginalized by the military regime.

¶6. (SBU) Endemic corruption throughout all levels of the police and the government make effective law enforcement difficult. Low salaries combined with inadequate training contribute to this problem while increased narcotics trafficking means that opportunities for corruption have increased exponentially. Corruption extends to the Ministry of Justice, with the result that corruption generally goes unpunished. Due to the underlying lack of rule of law, all but the most horrendous of crimes (e.g. kidnapping, murder) go un-prosecuted. This environment often discourages police forces from even attempting to launch major anti-crime initiatives.

¶7. (SBU) Guinea's police force is severely understaffed

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throughout the country. Most urban centers outside of Conakry have only a handful of officers for populations of 25,000 to several hundred thousand people. The former government launched a major recruitment effort in late 2008, but the military junta reportedly lacks the resources to pay salaries to these new officers. The Ministry of Security condones the practice of taking on "volunteer" police officers who wear uniforms, but generally do not carry firearms. The fact that these individuals are generally unpaid contributes to rampant corruption. In addition, some of these "volunteers" have been on the force for years awaiting fulfillment of promises of permanent employment, which have yet to materialize.

¶8. (SBU) A small number of mid-level police commanders possess a certain level of technical knowledge, often gained from attending training programs abroad. The vast majority of police officers have little to no policing skills due to the lack of a training program. Basic training is a three-month program that includes segments on human rights, women's rights, and riot control. Agents are supposed to undergo a nine-month training course while judicial police are supposed to undergo an 18 month course. However, the Guinean Police Academy is non-operational and any training efforts are haphazard at best.

¶9. (SBU) What little equipment remaining in the control of the civilian police forces is generally in poor condition. A small number of motor vehicles service all of Guinea, and are subject to frequent breakdowns. Side arms are not maintained and the majority is circa 1940.

¶10. (SBU) Under the military junta, the civilian policing forces (traditionally aligned with the Ministry of Security) are being reconstructed under both Security and now a newly formed Ministry of High Crimes and Anti-Drugs. It is unclear how responsibilities and resources will be divided. The President of the military junta recently authorized all security personnel to shoot anyone believed to be involved in drug trafficking, child trafficking, money laundering, or armed robbery. It is unclear who is included in the security forces. To date, no security personnel have tested this authority.

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TRAINING REQUIREMENTS  
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¶11. (SBU) Guinean policing services would benefit immensely from all forms of training. Basic police training programs, including how to construct programs, could immediately improve the quality and professionalism of the police. Leadership knowledge for mid-level officers would serve to reinforce and grow policing services. These types of training programs should target precinct police officers, Anti-Gang police, and Judicial Police.

¶12. (SBU) Specialized training, such as narcotics interdiction and customs inspections, would align with both Guinean objectives and other potential international donor support. This training would target the Anti-Drug Office (OCAD) and customs police (seaport, border, airport).

¶13. (SBU) Judiciary training, in any form, targeting all layers of the Ministry of Justice would serve not only to professionalize the judiciary but also to provide remedies to victims. The current judiciary functions without a generalized body of legal knowledge and with minimal finances.

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HOST GOVERNMENT AS A PARTNER  
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¶14. (SBU) Before the installation of the military junta, the Guinean Government was keenly interested in USG assistance for law enforcement programs. They repeatedly requested help with training, general guidance, equipment, and supplies. The new military regime has also expressed interest in working with the USG, but our current bilateral policy stance makes such cooperation difficult, if not impossible. The

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political situation remains fluid and it is unclear how long the current regime will stay in power. Guinea would be a willing partner, but it will be several months before we will know whether or not the country will be able to install a legitimate government in the near-term.

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OTHER INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS  
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¶15. (SBU) The French have provided a number of training programs for police over the years. They are currently training 90 police inspectors at the Anti-Riot base for one month, a program that was initiated before the December 23 coup d'etat. The training focuses on investigative techniques.

¶16. (SBU) Many international partners are currently reviewing their bilateral assistance programs in response to the coup, although the USG and Japan are the only countries to date to have announced a bilateral suspension of aid. Before the coup, Spain and the United Kingdom were interested in exploring programs targeting anti-narcotics initiatives.

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REGIONAL TRAINING FACILITIES  
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¶17. (U) There are no regional training centers in Guinea, nor is Embassy aware of any plans to construct one.

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POINT OF CONTACT  
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¶18. (U) Embassy point of contact is Regional Security

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